Text Messages May Not Be TCPA Calls In The Seventh Circuit

Text messages may soon occupy a very different place in Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) jurisprudence in the Seventh Circuit, with the court poised to decide whether SMS qualify as “calls” under the statute’s do‑not‑call (DNC) provisions at all. For credit and collection professionals operating in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, this emerging line of authority could materially narrow TCPA exposure for texting while simultaneously increasing the importance of state law and UDAAP risk management.

How We Got Here: From “Texts Are Calls” To Growing Skepticism

For years, courts and regulators treated text messages as functionally equivalent to calls for TCPA purposes, leaning heavily on FCC orders that interpreted “call” to cover SMS. Earlier Seventh Circuit authority accepted that framework, assuming that TCPA prohibitions applied to texts sent to cell phones.

That consensus began to fracture as courts reassessed the statutory text and the scope of delegated FCC authority, especially after the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of “automatic telephone dialing system” (ATDS) in Facebook v. Duguid and related appellate decisions like Gadelhak v. AT&T Services in the Seventh Circuit. As judges narrowed what equipment is covered, some began asking a more fundamental question: if Congress wrote “calls” in 1991—before SMS existed—did it ever actually bring text messages within the statute at all?

The New Question: Are Texts Even “Calls” Under § 227(c)?

The current flashpoint is whether TCPA’s DNC provisions in 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) apply to text messages, or whether only live and prerecorded voice calls to residential or wireless numbers are covered. District courts have split, with some holding that texts can trigger § 227(c) liability based on FCC guidance and Ninth Circuit precedent, and others concluding that “telephone calls” simply do not include SMS.

In Jones v. Blackstone Medical Services, a Central District of Illinois court became the first to hold that SMS messages are not “calls” for DNC purposes, explicitly rejecting the notion that FCC interpretations can stretch the unambiguous statutory language to include texting. The plaintiff appealed, and that question—whether § 227(c)’s use of “telephone calls” encompasses text messages—is now squarely before the Seventh Circuit. Two other courts, including one in the Fifth Circuit, have similarly concluded that texts are not subject to the TCPA at all because the statute references only “calls,” further amplifying the stakes of the Seventh Circuit’s decision.

Why Creditors And Collectors Should Care

For credit and collection organizations, the Seventh Circuit’s answer could reshape risk assumptions around outbound texting campaigns in several ways.

• If texts are not “calls” under § 227(c), national DNC list–based claims over SMS marketing or informational outreach could largely evaporate in the Seventh Circuit, shrinking the universe of potential TCPA class actions tied to texting.

• A ruling that narrows coverage to voice calls while leaving FCC’s text‑as‑call interpretation on shaky ground would invite defendants to challenge TCPA text claims more broadly, including in other circuits, and in some cases to attack FCC orders under the logic that agencies cannot expand unambiguous statutory language.

• Even if SMS fall outside § 227(c), texting could still implicate other parts of the TCPA—such as provisions covering autodialed or prerecorded calls to wireless numbers—depending on how courts harmonize the statutory text, FCC orders, and Supreme Court precedent.

Importantly, a narrower federal TCPA does not mean “safe to text.” State telemarketing laws, state mini‑TCPAs, unfair and deceptive acts or practices (UDAAP) theories, and CFPB expectations around consumer contact frequency and consent all remain very much in play. In practice, that means compliance programs will need to evolve, not relax.

The Seventh Circuit’s TCPA Track Record: Narrowing, Not Expanding

The betting line for many TCPA practitioners is that the Seventh Circuit may be receptive to a more textualist, limited understanding of “calls” that does not automatically sweep in SMS. That prediction rests on two strands of existing jurisprudence.

First, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, the Seventh Circuit adopted a narrow reading of ATDS, holding that only systems with the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers qualify—mere dialing from a stored customer list is not enough. The court emphasized the need to respect statutory syntax and avoid readings that would rope in virtually all modern dialing technology, a position the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed in Facebook v. Duguid.

Second, more recent district court messaging cases in other circuits have signaled a willingness to decouple SMS from “telephone calls,” particularly under the DNC provisions, and to question decades‑old FCC assumptions about texts. If the Seventh Circuit views the term “telephone call” as unambiguous, it may hold that the statute never extended to texting in § 227(c), regardless of earlier regulatory gloss.

Practical Compliance Takeaways For Texting Programs

Until the Seventh Circuit speaks, credit and collection firms should treat this as a developing but not yet bankable defense. Several practical steps can help position organizations to capitalize on a favorable ruling without over‑correcting in the meantime.

• Map claims by theory and channel. Separate your TCPA risk inventory between § 227(b) autodialer/prerecorded‑voice claims and § 227(c) DNC claims, and between voice and text channels, so you can quickly adjust litigation and settlement posture depending on how the Seventh Circuit rules.

• Preserve arguments in pending cases. In matters within the Seventh Circuit, defense counsel should preserve the position that texts are not “calls” for § 227(c), and consider seeking stays in appropriate cases where that issue could be dispositive, as defendants have done in other SMS class actions pending appellate guidance.

• Maintain conservative consent practices. Regardless of how the DNC issue is resolved, continue to obtain and document robust consent for both voice calls and texts, including clear disclosures about the nature and frequency of messages, to mitigate risk under other TCPA provisions, state law, and UDAAP theories.

• Monitor state law and CFPB expectations. States may react to any narrowing of federal TCPA coverage by tightening their own telemarketing and contact‑frequency rules, and the CFPB has already signaled close attention to digital communications and consumer preferences in debt collection.

If the Seventh Circuit ultimately declares that text messages are not “telephone calls” for DNC purposes, the case will likely become a cornerstone citation in TCPA text litigation nationwide and a catalyst for further challenges to FCC interpretations. For the credit and collection industry, that outcome would reduce one high‑stakes federal exposure vector for texts—but would also usher in a more fragmented, state‑centric compliance environment where careful jurisdiction‑by‑jurisdiction analysis becomes essential.