Brownstein Appeals Debt Collection Case To The United States Supreme Court

On June 26, 2025, Brownstein filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case, Six v. IQ Data International, Incorporated, No. 15887 (Feb. 24, 2025), reh’g denied (Mar. 28, 2025), turns on whether a consumer’s receipt of a single mailed letter creates harm concrete enough to create standing in FDCPA cases. Petitioning on behalf of IQ Data International, Brownstein urged the Supreme Court to take the case, clarify federal standing rules and bring uniformity and clarity to the FDCPA.

The case presents a pressing issue for collectors and debt buyers across the country: whether mere technical violations of the FDCPA create standing in federal courts. Practically speaking, the Ninth Circuit’s decision expands liability under the FDCPA and dramatically lowers the bar regarding what degree of harm consumers must face before they can resort to federal courts.

Brownstein’s work in the case exemplifies how broad experience with Congress, litigation, regulatory issues and appellate work can come together to benefit clients.

Background

The facts of the appealed case are relatively simple. Plaintiff had an overdue invoice related to his breach of a residential lease, which led to the invoice being placed with IQ Data, a professional collection agency. Through two different letters, the plaintiff both disputed the debt and informed IQ Data that he was represented by an attorney. IQ Data processed the former letter first and mailed a single validation request to the plaintiff before processing the attorney’s information. Had the former letter been processed first, no validation information would have been sent to the consumer. Under the FDCPA, communication with a consumer while that consumer is knowingly represented by an attorney is prohibited (15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(2)).

The plaintiff sued upon receipt of the letter and alleged privacy harms. On May 18, 2023, the District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the action in its entirety, holding that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence of concrete harm. In effect, though the court acknowledged that the letter may have been a violation of the FDCPA under § 1692c(a)(2), the court held that the harm the plaintiff suffered was not concrete enough to satisfy the threshold of Article III standing in federal courts. The court recognized that injuries in law are not always injuries in fact.

The plaintiff appealed that decision. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s decision on Feb. 24, 2025. The Ninth Circuit held that the alleged harm suffered by the plaintiff (receipt of a single, mailed letter) was analogous to the harm recognized by the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (essentially, a privacy tort). The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Spokeo and TransUnion to rely on the intrusion tort as a historical analogue for the alleged harm here.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision directly conflicts with similar cases, such as the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pucillo v. National Credit Systems, 66 F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2023). There, the Seventh Circuit found that receipt of two unwanted letters was too dissimilar from the historical harm remedied by the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. In other words, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that the receipt of two mailed letters did not create sufficient concrete harm to create standing in federal courts.

As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the case at issue here, a troubling circuit split exists that limits or expands liability under the FDCPA depending where consumers live and where collectors operate.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

In the filed petition, Brownstein argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision convoluted the Supreme Court’s standing precedent and threw the FDCPA into chaos by directly conflicting with the decisions of other circuits.

First, under the court’s precedent, in order to establish a concrete injury-in-fact, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their asserted injury (here, intrusion upon seclusion) is directly related to a traditionally recognized harm and not solely an injury-in-law. However, all traditionally recognized harms relating to intrusion upon seclusion are physical examples of invading one’s private life, such as eavesdropping, wiretapping or stalking. Sending a letter fails to meet the standard of establishing a concrete injury-in-fact. Brownstein argued that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the framework established in TransUnion, which directs the court to analogize the injury at issue with a close historical analogue. While the Ninth Circuit determined that the letter was an “irritating intrusion,” it did not consider the letter to be “highly offensive” to a “reasonable person,” which is the traditional standard for the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

Second, Brownstein argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision undermined Congress’ intent with the FDCPA and injected chaos into a statutory regime intended to be uniform and routine. The patchwork of rulings creating inconsistent application of the FDCPA undermines the American credit system and puts businesses and consumers alike at risk. When similarly situated consumers review a single mailed letter, their ability to rely on the FDCPA to litigate that “harm” will depend entirely on where the consumer lives. That was not Congress’s intent with the federal FDCPA. Brownstein urged the court to settle this circuit split.

Looking Ahead

Discrepancies within the FCPA have created a non-uniform patchwork across the United States, prompting inefficiencies in debt collection harming both consumers, credit providers and the collections industry. This is an urgent issue for the American credit system that needs resolution so that consumers and industry have clear rules to understand and follow.

While all petitions to the Supreme Court face a long road to being granted, advocacy before the Supreme Court remains an important tool in raising the issue and maintaining pressure on policymakers to resolve conflicts and ambiguities.

Brownstein, as always, is guided by our all in strategy that leads us to engage for our clients at every level of government and court—including before the Supreme Court of the United States.