Mixed Messages As Courts Rule On Text Messages Being “Calls” Under TCPA DNC Rules

There is not a new, unifying decision holding that text messages are or are not “calls” for TCPA Do‑Not‑Call (DNC) purposes; however the recent trend in the post‑Chevron / post‑Loper Bright landscape is confusing. Multiple federal district courts have recently held that texts are not “telephone calls” under § 227(c)(5)’s DNC private right of action, expressly rejecting prior FCC guidance that treated texts as the functional equivalent of calls.

Key points for your issue-spotting and compliance posture:

1. Recent cases going against coverage of SMS under DNC § 227(c):

   • N.D. Ohio – Stockdale v. Skymount Prop. Grp. (Mar. 3, 2026): Held that text messages are not subject to the TCPA DNC provision because “telephone calls” in § 227(c)(5), as understood in 1991, meant voice calls using a telephone to reproduce sound at a distance. The court applied ordinary-meaning analysis, citing McLaughlin and Loper Bright in declining to defer to FCC interpretations.

   • N.D. Ga. (2026 decision): Dismissed a TCPA DNC text case, holding that “telephone call” in § 227(c)(5) does not encompass text messages; emphasized that Congress elsewhere uses “text message” expressly, underscoring that “call” should not be stretched by agency interpretation.

   • C.D. Ill. (July 21, 2025 decision): Dismissed a DNC class action and found text messages not subject to § 227(c)(5), stressing that text technology did not exist in 1991 and that the provision refers only to “telephone calls.”

   • Other district courts (S.D. Fla., M.D. Fla., N.D. Fla., additional Illinois decisions) have followed similar reasoning, with some of these on appeal to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.

2. Courts that still treat texts as “calls” (minority view, often pre‑ or early post‑McLaughlin):

   • Some courts have held that texts are “calls” under § 227(c) based on FCC declaratory rulings and broader, more contemporary dictionary definitions, finding functional equivalence between SMS and voice calls for TCPA purposes.

   • Newall v. Childrens Dental Health: The court found unsolicited texts are covered as calls under the TCPA however receiving 2 texts is not sufficient to claim for inductive relief.

   • Example often cited on the “pro‑coverage” side: Wilson v. Skopos Financial (D. Or.), which treated SMS as “calls” within DNC provisions; in contrast, Jones v. Blackstone (C.D. Ill.) held the opposite.

3. Impact of Loper Bright and McLaughlin:

   • Courts are now explicit that they owe no Chevron deference to FCC interpretations in private TCPA cases, especially regarding the scope of § 227(c)(5).

   • This has led to a sharp split: some courts revert to strictly contemporaneous ordinary meaning (excluding text messages), while others still find FCC reasoning persuasive or rely on broader ordinary-meaning arguments.

4. Distinguish § 227(c) DNC from other TCPA provisions:

   • The recent “texts are not calls” decisions are tightly focused on § 227(c)(5) DNC claims, not on § 227(b) (ATDS / prerecorded voice) or other provisions where texts may still clearly be regulated.

   • FCC rulings that treat texts as “calls” remain relevant to non‑DNC TCPA theories, and plaintiffs can and do pivot to those where available.

5. Practical compliance / litigation implications:

   • Jurisdiction is critical. In some districts (e.g., N.D. Ohio, N.D. Ga., C.D. Ill.), a DNC‑only theory based on texts now faces substantial dismissal risk.

   • However, the split and pending appeals to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits mean the law remains unsettled at the circuit level, so national or multi‑state programs should not assume SMS is categorically outside DNC exposure.

   • Plaintiffs’ bar is adjusting pleadings to emphasize non‑DNC TCPA theories (e.g., autodialer, prerecorded, artificial voice) and state‑law analogues where text coverage is clearer.

6. Read the white paper on the TCPA and Text messages in the industry trends section of Credit and Collection News: Click here to read the report