Debt Collector’s Statutorily Required Communication Did Not Pose An Actual Harm To Establish Article III Standing Under FDCPA

By Kathleen Bianco, J.D.

Noting conflicting statutory obligations, the Eighth Circuit asserted that the consumer’s request to cease communications could not override the debt collector’s obligation to respond to a credit report dispute.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court ruling in favor of a consumer who alleged that a debt collection agency had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by sending a debt verification letter after the consumer contested the debt and requested no further contact. A majority of the appellate panel concluded that the consumer lacked Article III standing because she had not suffered a concrete injury. Contrary to the findings of the district court, the appellate panel found that the debt verification letter was not an intrusion upon seclusion and was, in fact required under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) after the consumer filed a dispute of credit report information. A dissenting opinion addressing the question of standing, argued that even a single unwanted communication constituted a concrete harm sufficient to satisfy Article III standing requirements (Denmon v. Kansas Counselors, Inc., No. 23-3612 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025)).

Background. In 2016, the plaintiff, Marcia Denmon, incurred medical debt that was later assigned to Kansas Counselors, Inc. (KCI), a debt collection agency. KCI sent an initial collection letter in 2017, which Denmon failed to dispute within the 30-day window provided under the FDCPA. The FDCPA allows a consumer to dispute a debt within 30 days of receiving written notice of the debt and prohibits debt collectors from further contact with the consumer upon a written request to cease communications. Several years after the initial notice had been sent, Denmon sent a fax to KCI indicating that as a result of a review of her credit report, she was disputing the debt and requesting no further contact. In response, KCI sent a verification letter establishing that it had investigated the claim and provided proof that the claim was valid as it is required to do under the FCRA.

Following that communication, Denmon filed suit against KCI under the FDCPA, claiming that the letter violated her right to privacy and caused her emotional distress. KCI argued that Denmon has suffered no tangible injury and therefore could not establish Article III standing. Denmon argued that the single, unwanted letter sent by KCI “intruded upon her seclusion and invaded her privacy.” The district court agreed and further concluded that the letter violated the FDCPA. Consequently, the district court granted Denmon’s motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the court awarded Denmon $1,000 in damages and an additional $60,000 in costs and attorneys’ fees. KCI appealed, challenging the district court’s ruling on Article III standing.

Article III standing. For Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that they “suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent,” that the injury was likely caused by the defendant, and that the injury could be redressed by judicial relief. In its appeal, KCI argued that Denmon had not suffered a real injury. After examining the evidence, the appellate panel agreed, reversing the lower court’s ruling and remanding the proceeding with instructions that the matter be dismissed. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court found that Denmon failed to establish a “concrete injury” as required under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021). The harm alleged by Denmon was based on an intrusion into her seclusion. In order to be actionable, the court noted that the intrusion must be intentional and “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” The appellate panel found neither element satisfied, reasoning that the letter was statutorily required under the FCRA and was informational.

No contact provision. The court further opined that while the FDCPA had a no contact provision, the FCRA did not because such a provision would hinder the obligations of the debt collector who furnished information to credit reporting agencies to respond to consumer disputes. Because Denmon was disputing information on a credit report and not the initial notification of the debt, the letter sent by KCI in response to the debt dispute was not a valid basis for a violation of the no contact provision found in the FDCPA.

Having found no basis for the claim and no standing, the judgment of the district court in favor of the consumer was vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Dissent. In her dissent, Judge Kelly took a broader interpretation of Article III standing, focusing on the nature of the harm and not the severity. She opined that even a single unwanted letter, regardless of the intent of the sender, should be enough to confer standing.

The Case is No. 23-3612.

Judge: Loken, J.

Attorneys: Ryan M. Callahan (Callahan Law Firm) for Marcia Denmon. Joshua C. Dickinson (Spencer Fane LLP) for Kansas Counselors, Inc.

Companies: Kansas Counselors, Inc.

https://www.vitallaw.com/news/debt-collection-8th-cir-debt-collector-s-statutorily-required-communication-did-not-pose-an-actual-harm-to-establish-article-iii-standing-under-fdcpa/blw0135b6c45ac0d342d3b0496bd87fe07bf4?refURL=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F#.